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I  would  like to thank you  ~or so graciously giving me  the 
opportunity to come  here  todaY;  to talk about  a  matter which has 
generated tensions in transatlantic economic  and political relations 
which  cannot be  ignored. 
Purely in a  personal capacity,  and in the spirit of Jean Monnet 
and Walter Hallstein,  I  would  like to consider the opportunities and 
challenges implicit in this crisis, rather than reiterate the 
exasperation and bitterness which  seem to have  afflicted the pro-
tagonists in official and business circles as disagreement has 
heightened in the last months  and weeks.  Nor  am  I  going to say any-
thing about the legal aspect.  The  E.C.'s legal position,  based on 
the unanimous  opinion of all the member  states and  Community  insti-
tutions,  remains  as it was  presented in the Commission's memorandum 
of August  12 of this year.  I  would merely  like to remind you that 
the origin of the present crisis dates back to the times before the 
Carter Administration.  At that time,  the U.S.  strongly supported the 
European-Russian gas pipeline project,  which was  linked to Iranian 
gas deliveries to the southern Soviet Union:  the tripartite gas pro-




On  both sides of the Atlantic, all comments  and criticisms already 
voiced,  justifiably, on previous occasions  can also be applied to the 
origins of the current dispute. 
1.  The  unpredictability and unreliability of the decision-making 
processes in both Washington  and  Europe,  which  involve  so many  people. 
2.  Non-existent or inadequate transatlantic consultation and a 
lack of effort to achieve  an Atlantic consensus. 
3.  The  lack of tested procedures or structures to cope with 
economic crisis management,  due to a  great extent to the reluctance 
on both sides to allow outside influences to affect decision-making 
procedures at an early stage. 
4.  A host of other personal,  psychological  and domestic policy 
considerations  and  imponderables  could be added to this list. 
5.  The  permanent battle between economic  and  foreign policy 
makers  here  and in the ten Community  capitals.  Economists  tend to 
think that the national interest is nothing more  than the sum  of 
industrial and business interests.  Foreign and defense policy experts, 
on the other hand,  sometimes  seem to believe that one  can  simply turn 
the spigot of economic  flows  on and off without measuring its extent 
or calculating its cost.  It is then easy to criticize the  "business 
as usual" brigade,  on the one  hand,  and  the  "ideologues"  and  "cold 
warriors"  on  the other. '  ' 
--~------------------------
However,  the following points can be made: 
1.  For at least 25  years,  there has been no  fundamental  or far-
reaching debate on  the  NATO  allies'  economic  relations with the 
Eastern bloc.  Nor  has  the matter been discussed fully at the Western 
economic  summits.  Even  within the  European  Community  and the European 
Political Cooperation  framework,  talks on  a  common  economic policy 
towards  the East have  never reached the point where  consensus  can be 
achieved on  an overall approach. 
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2.  On  both sides,  there have been persuasive reasons  for pragma-
tism and  "muddling through".  Rather than lambasting each other blindly, 
we  should consider such a  common  economic policy as  a  serious challenge. 
This  should be all the more  possible since,  with the  lessons of the un-
sucessfull  1962 pipeline embargo  and  the  Iran,  Afghanistan  and 
Poland  crises behind us,  in addition to the discussions currently 
going on  in COCOM  and among  consortia of worried bankers,  we  have  a 
considerable foundation of experience on which to build.  Yet,  all 
this has  not been  enough to prevent the current dispute  from  arising. 
3.  Even within the  European Community,  signs of progress on  a 
common  policy towards  economic  relations with the Eastern bloc is in-
creasingly evident.  Compared  with the resounding silence which 
accompanied the Afghanistan crisis,  the limited,  but in itself 
significant,  ban on the importation of various Soviet manufactures, 
adopted this spring by majority vote under Article 113 of the E.E.C. 
Treaty,  represents,  in European  terms,  striking progress within a ~-~---- ~-------~--------------------------
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relatively short period of time. 
4.  Neither side should be  content simply to get the current 
issue resolved one way  or another.  We  have to work  out a  crisis-
proof consensus-oriented procedure  and  a  coordinated policy towards 
........ 
economic  relations with the Eastern bloc which would prevent any 
repetition of such discord.  These would also credibly--demonstrate 
our firmness to the Soviet Union.  Otherwise,  the  Russians,  on  the 
"'  sideline, will continue to be.the main beneficiaries of these 
..  . 
avoidable dissensions in the Atlantic camp.  This is a  challenge 
not only for transatlantic relations, but for the European  Com-
munity itself.  Progress in this direction will help pave  the way  for a 
solution of the pipeline dispute.  Urgently,  and  without 
panic,  we  need to sit down  together to take  a  cool,  constructive 
look at our common  problems,  remembering that, unless  we  have 
mutual  respect for each other and  a  partnership of equals,  there 
can be  no  lasting,  sound,  crisis-proof Atlantic relationship. 
Partnership,  by the way,  does  not exclude leadership.  But 
leadership within a  partnership has  to be exercised through 
persuasion and  circumspection,  taking account of the interests 
of the Alliance as  a  whole  and of its individual members. 
At  this stage,  I  cannot give you  any detailed picture of 
possible solutions.  Such  an  attempt would be doomed  to failure. 
But perhaps it might still be useful to identify both a  number 
of problems  and  areas of common  agreement,  to enable us to get 
at the heart of this contentious matter. --------------------------
5 
.  ' 
1.  The  Soviet Union is no ordinary trading partner.  It is 
neither a  member  of GATT  nor bound by the rules of a  liberal 
world economic order. 
2.  The  Soviet economy  is more  "politicized" than  any other. 
Leninists regard any  economic policy as having political objectives. 
3.  Consequently,  the economy  of the  USSR  is put fully at the 
- disposal of an expansionist - ·_not  to say imperialistic - foreign 
policy and its associated bid for power. 
4.  This  function of the Soviet economy  is clearly reflected 
in the unusually high proportion of the national product devoted 
to defense  spending:  12-15%  would be  a  conservative estimate for 
the  1970s.  Given  the difficulty of calculating many  expenditures, 
there is reason to think the real figure  could be  even higher. 
5.  This massive  Soviet armament program,  extending over 
more  than  a  decade  and beyond  any possible  requirements  for defense, 
has  created the fear that the  United States and its allies may  be 
dangerously outpaced and  outclassed.  I  need not here to go into 
detail regarding aspects of individual weapons  superiority or the 
controversy about  the precise size of the  "window of vulnerability". 
Looking beyond  narrow statistics to the whole  dynamic of defense 
developments,  there can be no  doubt that an  imbalance exists. . ' 
6.  On  the part of the soviet Union,  the  struggle for military 
superiority has been quite coldly calculated.  A look at COMECON 
forward planning  from  1970 to 1981  leads to this conclusion.  It is 
also clear that planned  improvements  in performance  have mainly 
benefitted the military sector.  Overall,  Eastern bloc economies 
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have  not performed up  to expectations.  It is scarcely an exaggeration, 
therefore,  to say that the Soviet economy  is increasingly turning into a 
military economy  which is also responsible  for  feeding 
and clothing its civilian population. 
7.  In the confrontation with Soviet power politics,  the 
security of the West  is threatened on  the  economic  front by the 
Soviet Union's ability to keep  on  spending  a  huge,  and still in-
creasing,  proportion of its gross national product on defense. 
This is compelling the West  in turn to maintain a  certain level of 
defense  spending,  thereby imposing  a  heavy  burden on its economic, 
financial  and social structures,  causing public sector deficits, 
increases in interest rates,  cuts in social and development aid 
spending,  and inefficient use of resources. 
8.  It is therefore necessary to keep  an eye  on  our economic 
relations with the Eastern bloc to see whether or not,  and to what 
extent,  they maintain or even strengthen the Soviet Union's military 
capacity.  Any  commercial or political advantages to the West  must 
be measured against such a  potential development.  To  monitor 
developments  in this way  we  need  a  reference  system which must be 7 
comparable,  if not identical,  in each country.  Such data would 
serve as  a  basis for periodical reviews of East-West  economic 
relations. 
9.  Similarly,  we  must  continue with the  COCOM  system,  updating it 
to keep pace with the development of defense  systems 
and defense  technology.  It is essential to concentrate on making 
COCOM  more  effective.  Adequate ~anctions must be applied against 
all attempts to circumvent the rules. 
10.  There are broad differences of opinion in Europe  and 
the United States as to the effectiveness of trade sanctions in 
general,  and in particular regarding embargoes  against the Eastern 
bloc.  On  the whole,  Europe  tends to take a  more  skeptical view than  . 
the United States.  This  skepticism is caused by a  long experience 
- from  Napoleon's blockade of Britain,  the Continental System, 
through the unsuccessful attempts at embargoes  by  the  League  of 
Nations against Italy in 1935 or by the U.N.  against Rhodesia 
in the  1960s  and  1970s,  up to the more  recent Iranian hostage 
crisis and  the  invasion of Afghanistan. 
At  the  same  time,  Europeans  tend to forget about the U.S., 
British and  Dutch boycott against Japan before Pearl Harbour 
and  the considerable damage  inflicted on  Germany  and  the Central 
European powers  in the First World  War  as a  result of the allied 
blockade.  The  Community,  however,  is not totally opposed to the use 
of economic  sanctions.  They  were  applied against Rhodesia,  Iran, 8 
and Argentina following the Falklands invasion. 
I  believe that if we  sat down  together and  examined the problem we 
could considerably narrow down,  if not altogether eliminate, 
our differences of opinion,  assuming  we  could agree on the  following 
basic premises: 
(i)  A boycott can be  an effective weapon provided that: 
(a)  potential suppliers are sufficiently firm  and 
disciplined to prevent any breaking of the ranks 
or major circumvention of the boycott;  and 
(b)  the  country against which  the measures  are being 
taken is vitally dependent on the  imports of the 
embargoed products  (as  Japan was  on oil, copper, 
and  scrap iron in 1941).  In that case, it will 
have its back to the wall,  and its only alter-
natives will be  compliance or war. 
(ii)  If the  sanctions are not watertight,  on the other hand, 
or if the target country is not vitally dependent on  the 
embargoed products  - as is usually the  case with the 
Eastern bloc countries  - then problems regularly arise 
from differences in the political and  economic  assessment 
of the measures.  One  criterion would have to be the effect 
of the  embargo  on the pattern of resource allocation within --------------------------------------------
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the  economy  of the target country - in this case the Soviet 
Union. 
For instance, if the West  were able to implement an 
effective ban on grain supplies,  the Soviet Union would  ,  .. 
have  to divert resources  away  from other sectors perma-
nently - including probably defense  - to agriculture. 
It might  even have  to contemplate  a  change  in its whole 
- farming  system,  encouraging more  decentralization and 
private initiative, or an  adoption of certain other 
elements of the market  economy.  But,  as  the Afghanistan 
situation has  shown,  the West's problem is that it is 
almost  impossible to guarantee that such an  embargo will 
be  complied with.  In any event,  I  cannot  imagine  a  trans-
atlantic consensus  on  a  common  East-West trade policy 
without coherent rules on agricultural exports. 
(iii)  Again,  we  should bear in mind  that an  attempted 
embargo may  hit the suppliers harder than the 
country against which it is aimed.  At  a  time of 
economic crisis,  for instance,  halting exports 
could result in job losses or damage  to the 
economy  in certain areas,  with no prospect of 
early relief.  Meanwhile  the Soviet Union has  no 
problem in finding  supplies elsewhere,  at little 
extra cost.  Just as it is important to measure  the 
social cost of sanctions in the United States and 
in Europe by means  of the  same  yardstick,  so it is equally important,  in my  opinion,  to respect a 
decision by  a  government,  on either side that 
that cost would be unbearable. 
(iv)  It is no  surprise,  therefore,  that a  policy of total 
refusal of economic  relations,  a  trade war or an all-
out blockade is rarely advocated.  To  begin with, it 
is not feasible because of its likely lack of effect-
iveness.  Besides,  total refusal would provide the 
Soviet Union with  a  considerable lever.  In domestic 
policy, it would  burden  the Soviet consumer,  forcing 
him to become  self-sufficient, if necessary by using 
the  repressive measures of the Stalin era.  It might 
appeal  to the citizens'  sense of patriotism, possibly 
making the Soviet Union politically even  stronger than 
before,  a  point that has been made  by Ota Sik,  the 
economic brain of the  Prague  Spring of 1968.  Those 
who  advocate total refusal of economic  relations 
will have  to realize that they create a  pretext for 
all Eastern bloc debtors to discontinue debt service. 
The possible repercussions  on our banking system need 
no elaboration. 
(V)  Reflection on the pros  and  cons of acquiring primary 
energy  from  the Soviet Union  need not go  further. 
If it is true that oil and natural gas are  limited 
10 .  ·-
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resources,  and if it is true that the  OPEC  states 
still have  a  political hold over Europe,  then 
obtaining primary energy  from  the Soviet Union 
should not be dismissed out of hand but sub-
jected to discriminating examination  • 
Suppliers would be  considered as having  a  hold over Europe 
only if a  sudden cut-off of supplies would  lead to social and 
political destabilization in the  customer countries.  There  is~ 
no  need to fear  such  a  development if sufficient reserve capacity, 
flexibility of consumer structures,  stocks  and  other suitable 
precautionary measures  are  taken care of,  since such measures 
would  take  the  sting out of any  interruption of supply. 
Many  steps have been undertaken,  for example  in West 
Germany  over the last four years,  to reduce vulnerability 
to such  an eventuality considerably.  Those  steps also need to 
be  implemented in other European  states. 
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Thus  far,  the discussion has not dealt with the possibility that, 
if the Soviet Union  had  a  larger share of the  European 
market  for gas, it could initiate the creation of producer 
alliances whose  aggregate  share could be enough to give  them 
a  stranglehold over the West  {e.g.  Algeria,  Iran,  Nigeria, 
the MiddleEast).  It is also possible that the producers 
of several energy sources  (oil and  gas)  could get together 
in new  kinds of producer alliances.  It is very difficult to see what will happen over a  25-year timespan. 
Europe  is still in need of effective safety precautions 
here. 
12.  I  do not think that industry either in this country 
or in Europe  can be  given an  ironclad guarantee,  as is--oc-
casionally demanded  in Europe,  that no  sanctions against 
Eastern bloc countries or any other potential target country 
will be  imposed.  Quite apart from  anything else,  such  an 
undertaking would  amount to giving the Soviet Union  "carte 
blanche", politically speaking,  to pursue its power politics 
with even less regard for the  consequences  than hitherto and 
thereby to endanger peace. 
The  business community,  therefore,  must assess the risks 
involved in business transactions with the East differently 
and  continue to rate them  as having much  higher risks than those with 
other countries.  It can be  expected to shape its 
business relations with the Easter bloc countries accordingly. 
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13.  I  think there is an urgent need in economic relations to deal 
separetly with the Soviet Union  and  the individual Eastern bloc states. 
Any  tendency to treat the Eastern bloc as  a  single entity would be 
tantamount to a  political reward  for  the Soviet Union.  We  all know 
that, ever since the creation of the  CEMA,  the Soviet union has been 
trying to exercise  a  commercial  tutelage over the Eastern bloc that 13 
would be politically as well  as legally acknowledged by the West.  We 
must make  a  determined stand to prevent this from occurring. 
This  also explains why  there are no  diplomatic relations between 
the European  Community  and the Soviet Union.  We  have  no interest in  .•... 
preventing peaceful change  in Eastern Europe. 
·-
14.  Dealing separately wi~h the Soviet Union  and  the individual 
.,. 
Eastern bloc does  not preclude,  for example,  the  taking of measures to 
re-establish sound conditions,  laying squarely at the door of the Soviet 
Union  the burden of rectifying economic errors in those states which are 
condemned  to follow the  communist  economic  system.  If the  Soviet Union 
then says it cannot pay its debts,  this will  leave  the  waY,  clear for  a 
more  constructive solution to the  economic  problems of the heavily 
indebted states of the Eastern bloc.  In this respect,  the 
conditionality of loans granted by the  IMF  would  take on particular 
significance.  For  I  consider it intolerable that the  terms  for Eastern 
bloc borrowers  should turn out to be  less strict, taking account of the 
communist  economic  system,  than those that must be borne by other states 
in a  similar situation. 
In  judging Soviet economic policy towards  the West,  we  should not 
ignore the synergistic effect caused by Europe's geographical  and 
geopolitical situation in relation to the energy-rich Soviet Union. 
The  Soviet practice of taking a  long-term view of all kinds of 
infrastructure problems  and basing its solution  on the requirements of 14 
the entire continent of Eurasia means  that such planning also embraces 
the Eurasian peninsula of Europe,  either directly or indirectly.  Seen 
from  Europe'  s  point of view,  this practice can also be interpreted as a 
Soviet penetration strategy.  We  should  look beyond  the controversial gas 
pipeline question and think about the high voltage transmission systems  ... 
and  the  future possibility of modern  coal transportation systems, 
looking at them in the  same  context as the penetration  --of  inland 
waterways via the Danube,  Rhine  and Main  rivers,  the extension of 
..,. 
coastal  shipping services in the Black  Sea  and  the Baltic, or plans for 
a  larger railway network. 
If Western  Europe wants to retain its independence  in the face  of 
these risks of penetration, it will have to take the necessary precau-
tionary measures to build up its own  overall strategy so that the 
penetration does not impose  a  political burden or even  impair its 
freedom of action. 
It is worth mentioning in this context that a  whole  series of 
arrangements resulting from  Basket Two  of the Helsinki Act,  on recipro-
cal opportunities for establishment and free  access to markets,  data and 
other facilities,  are being  implemented in a  highly unbalanced manner. 
In Western  European ports,  there are  complete networks of Soviet 
services.  Yet,  there is nothing to match  them in Soviet or Eastern 
European ports,  let alone  any  comparable business opportunities in 
Moscow. 15 
The  totally unbalanced situation as far as costs are concerned also 
plays an essential part here.  Lately,  the Soviet union has even been 
gradually withdrawing the meager  concessions it made  in Helsinki,  as is 
shown  by the drastic reduction of telephone conversations.  This makes 
the  lack of reciprocity in the services sector even more  difficult to 
l  •. 
'• 
overlook. 
16.  Besides  Europe  has make  mistakes of historic proportions in 
.. 
the matter of the gas  supply contracts,  due  to a  lack of unanimity and 
farsightedness.  Indeed,  the individual European states or supplying 
firms  negotiated separately,  so that the Soviet Union was  able to play 
them off one  against the other.  Europe  could have used its level of 
demand  much  more  profitably,  economically and hence also politically, 
since it is the only  customer which  can purchase  40,000 million cm3 
worth of gas over the next  25  years  and still pay for it in hard curren-
cy.  Consequently,  the Soviet Union  did not need to pay any political 
price for  25  years of certainty about this  source of its foreign ex-
change. 
In this respect,  certain parallels come  to mind  concerning the 
talks  I  have  already referred to on rescheduling the  loans on which 
individual Eastern bloc states have defaulted. 
17.  As  far as access to modern oil and gas  equipment  technology in 
particular is concerned,  I  think the arguments  in favor of restricted 
access are  compelling.  The  fears  that were  expressed at the time of -
shall we  say - the first Dresser case  in 1979/80 here in Washington,  but ,_ .. 
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also in Europe,  about the  consequences of a  restrictive Western stance, 
see~ to me  to have  been exaggerated.  The  Soviet position concerning oil 
and gas supplies is not so desperate that the refusal to supply modern 
technology would have  forced  - or will in the future  force  - it to take 
military action in the Persian Gulf or the Middle East.  However,  an 
embargo  would probably have  forced the Soviet Union  to make  a  bigger 
investment effort than it would have with Western  coal ··and  gas  equipment 
technology. 
18.  The  biggest controversy between Europe  and  the United States 
is over the volume  of credit given to the Eastern bloc.  Apart  from  the 
fact that the sobering experience of the banking  community with Poland 
and  Romania  offers quite  a  good guarantee against any  further irrespon-
sible credit policies,  I  believe that the  European states should put a 
stop to loans granted,  on preferential terms,  to the Soviet Union,  as 
was  hoped  for at the Versailles Conference.  The  moot point is the 
assessment of export risk guarantee  systems which work  on  a  commercial 
basis.  But it should be possible to find  satisfactory solutions to this 
too.  The  real problem is that interest rates vary enormously in the big 
supplier states and that those supplier states with high interest rates 
cannot accept being edged out of business with the Eastern bloc for this 
reason.  Therefore, if the capital markets of the supplier states with 
low interest rates were  liberalized and were  open to the suppliers from 
the states with high interest rates,  there would be  no  need to comply 
with their wish to reach agreements  on  comparable credit terms.  Since 
this process is not yet completed, it will be  necessary to hold further 
consultations on  the basis of the  OECD  consensus. 17 
To  conclude this by  no means  complete list of points,  on which  a 
consensus  should be obtained once  and  for all,  I  believe that an  econom-
ic policy vis-a-vis the East,  based on  these ideas,  would not drive the 
Soviet Union  into a  corner from which there is no  escape.  It would 
always  have  the opportunity,  for  example,  through more  constructive 
disarmament negotiations,  to create a  climate in which  economic re-
lations with it would  again become  worthwhile  and enable  long-term 
calculations to be made.  However,  as  long as the Soviet Union  continues 
~ 
forcing us to arm at a  totally unreasonable rate, it cannot expect to 
benefit, without making political concessions,  from  the advantages of a 
world economic  system based on the division of labor. 
I  am  fully aware of the  fact that the  Soviet Union  could probably 
be  the most promising market in the world if the  system there were 
democratic,  devoid of pretensions to world  dominance  and of an 
imperialistic foreign policy. 
However,  several decades  could pass by before this happens  and 
those economic circles which are already trying to anticipate such  a 
development in the  long-term planning of their business relations might 
do well to postpone their hopes  for  a  liberalization of the Soviet Union 
to the distant future. 
In conclusion,  I  would like to repeat that the opinions expressed 
here are purely my  own.  However,  they derive  from many  a  speech  I  was 
privileged to make  on this subject in the Bundestag as  spokesman  for 
the opposition in the years between  1976 and  1980,  at a  time when .. 
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such observations did not arouse as much  interest in the  United States 
as  I  would  have  liked them to. 
To  end my  personal remarks  about this thorny and complicated 
subject,  I  would  like to come  back to my  European foster fathers,  Jean 
Monnet  and Walter Hallstein,  and  say that I  am  convinced that our common 
problems  are  soluble if we  work  together.  The  refusal--to talk,  the 
escalation of action and  counteraction or attempts to exert massive 
pressure would be  more  than  just dangerous,  they would constitute a 
rejection of the values which unite us across the Atlantic. 